1 Ledesma v Climaco
FACTS:
▪
Ledesma is counsel de parte of one
accused. Thereafter, he was appointed as Election Registrar of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental by COMELEC
▪
Ledesma withdrew as counsel on the
basis that his appointment as Election Registrar would require full time
service as well as on the volume or pressure of work will prevent him from
handling adequately the defense.
▪
Judge Climaco denied his motion, and
even appointed him as counsel de officio of the accused.
ISSUE: WoN the withdrawal of Ledesma should
be allowed
HELD: No.
RATIO:
1.
There is obvious reluctance of
Ledesma to comply with his responsibilities as counsel de oficio. Then, even
assuming that he continues his position, his volume of work is likely to be
very much less than present. There is no excuse for him to shirk from his
obligation as member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should
fulfill.
2.
Ledesma was not mindful of his
obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to know that membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions. Being appointed as counsel de oficio
requires a high degree of fidelity (law is a profession and not a mere trade).
Requires counsel of repute and eminence.
3.
In criminal cases, right to counsel
is absolute. No fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel.
4.
The denial by Judge Climaco was due
to the principal effect to delay the case (case has already been postponed for
8 times)
2 In Re Sycip
FACTS:
§ This
is a consolidated petition. The first
one filed by the surviving partners of atty. Alexander Sycip and the other
filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ovaepa. They pray that they be allowed to continue
using the names of partners who had
passed away.
§ Petitioners
based their petitions on the following arguments:
o
Art. 1840 of the Civil Code,
o
in regulating other professions, the
legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction
as to the use of the name of a deceased partner,
o
the Canons of Professional Ethics
allows the continued use of a deceased partner when permissible by local
custom.
ISSUE:
§ W/N
law firms may continue to use the names o deceased partners in their firm names
HELD:
§ NO!
§ Art.
1840 primarily deals with the exception of liability on cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts
contracted by the person who continues the business using the partnership
name. what the law contemplates is a
hold over situation preparatory to formal reorganization. Art. 1840 treats more of a commercial
partnership with a good will to protect rather than a professional partnership
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual
members.
§ A
partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by
other professionals or for business. a
partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is not a partnership formed for then
purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property. Thus, assumed or trade name in law practice
is improper. The right to practice law
is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise.
§ It
must be considered that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows
the continued use of a deceased partner’s name.
Therefore, the cited provision on Canons of Professional Ethics is not
applicable.
DISSENTING OPINION:
§ Petition
may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of
the 2 firms that Sycip and Ovaepa are dead or the period when they served as
partners sould be stated therein.
3 Cayetano v Monsod
Facts:
§ Pres.
Aquino nominated Christian Monsod to the position of COMELEC chairman.
§ The
Commission on Appointments affirmed the nomination and appointed Monsod to the
position.
§ Renato
Cayetano now assails the appointment. He
says that Monsod is not qualified to the position because he has not been
“engaged in the practice of law for ten years” (requirement is provided by
Consti Art. 9-C Sec. 1(1)).
Issue:
§ W/n
Monsod is qualified for the position of COMELEC chairman.
Held:
§ SC
says yes. Monsod passed the bar in 1960
and had been consistently paying his professional fees. He worked in a law firm for several years
after graduating but after that, had been more engaged in business and politics
(for a list of his jobs, see p.238).
Still, the SC said that he can still be considered as practicing law, if
we consider the modern concept of the practice of law. This modern concept pertains to any act,
whether in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
§ SC
now says that since most of Monsod’s jobs involved the law, even if he has not
been engaged in traditional lawyering (i.e. making pleadings or appearing in
court), he can still be considered as to have been engaged in the practice of
law.
Dissents:
§ Most
of the dissents focused on the issue that the Consti requirement pertains to
habitual practice of law. The dissenters
pointed out that for the past ten years, Monsod really seldom practiced
law. This group believed that the Consti
required that the practice of law be on a regular basis. Justice Padilla even came up with
qualifications – habituality; compensation; application of law, legal
principle, practice or procedure; and atty.-client relationship – to determine
w/n a person has been engaged in the practice of law..
4 Cui v Cui
Facts:
§ The
main concern in this case is the respective qualifications of Jesus Cui and
Antonio Cui to the position of administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barii,
a charitable institution established by Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui.
§ Jesus
and Antonio are the sons of Mariano Cui, a nephew of the founders of the
institution. Antonio’s claim to the position is based on a “convenio” where
then administrator Teodoro resigned in favor of him. Jesus, however, had no
prior notice of this.
§ Jesus’s
claim is that he should be preferred pursuant to the deed of donation (which
recognized their father Mariano as a legitimate descendant to the position) as
he is the older of the two.
§ The
deed, however, gives preference to a descendant who has a “titulo de abogado”
or a doctor, or a civil engineer, or a pharmacist (in order). Or to the one who
pays the highest taxes. Jesus holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws but is not a
member of the Bar, while Antonio is a member of the Bar (he was formerly
disbarred, though, by the SC and was just reinstated weeks before assuming the
position)
Issue:
Who has a better right to the position of
administrator between Jose and Antonio?
What does the term “titulo de abogado”
mean?
Held:
Antonio. The term “titulo de abogado” is
not just mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one to the
practice of law. Possession of the degree is not indispensable to qualify as a
lawyer since completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other
way.
It was also argued that Antonio is
disqualified for having been previously disbarred since the deed also provided
that an administrator may be removed if found to lack a sound moral character.
However, Antonio was reinstated. This reinstatement is a recognition of his
moral rehabilitation after proving what was required by the Bar. Antonio’s
restoration to the roll of lawyers wiped out restrictions and disabilities
resulting from the previous disbarment.
5 Alawi v Alauya
PARTIES
§ ALAWI,
sales rep of E.B. Villarosa
§ ALAUYA,
incumbent executive clerk of court
FACTS
§ Through
ALAWI’S agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
ALAUYA of a housing unit
§ A
housing loan was also granted to ALAUYA by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC)
§ Subsequently,
ALAUYA wrote a letter to the President of Villarosa advising termination of his
contract on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by ALAWI and proceeded to expound using acerbic language
§ A
copy of the letter, which bore no stamps, was sent to the VP of Villarosa
§ ALAUYA
also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as void his contract with Villarosa and asking
for cancellation of his loan
§ Finally,
ALAUYA wrote 3 other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions from his
salary regarding the loan from NHMFC
§ NHMFC
also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions
§ Learning
of the letters, ALAWI filed a complaint alleging that ALAUYA
o
Committed malicious and libelous
charges
o
Usurped the title of attorney
ISSUE W/N ALAUYA VIOLATED THE
CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
HELD YES,
PARTICULARLY SECTION 4
RATIO
§ Section
4 “public officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others,
and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, public order, public safety and
public interest”
§ ALAUYA,
being a member of the Shari’a Bar and an officer of the Court, may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise
improper
§ His
radical deviation from these norms cannot be excused
ISSUE W/N ALAUYA BEING A MEMBER
OF THE SHARI’A BAR CAN USE THE TITLE “ATTORNEY”
HELD NO, RESERVED ONLY FOR THOSE
WHO HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
RATIO
§ Court
has already had an occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar
are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may practice law only
before Shari’a courts
§ ALAUYA’S
wish of not using “counsellor” because of confusion with “councilor” is immaterial because disinclination to use said title
does not warrant his use of the title “attorney”
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